December 5, 2002

A MAKE-OR-BREAK MOMENT FOR PREVENTION
BIG PROBLEMS IN BUILDING THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
By Dr. Saul B. Wilen

A make-or-break moment in the war on terrorism is at hand with the establishment of this spanking new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It’s almost like being given a second chance. America has the ability to win the war on terrorism, but equally America has the ability to lose it.

Careful decisions in establishing this new department are critical to assuring productive and successful results. This window of opportunity is small and fleeting. It must be used to establish the prevention focus so desperately required.

According to surveys, many Americans believe that for the most part the nation is better protected from terrorism today than it was before the attacks of September 11, 2001. Yet a Council on Foreign Relations report dated October 24, 2002 revealed that the U.S. is still “dangerously unprepared” to respond to more terrorist threats. The conspicuous presence of redundant security personnel around the country (shoe-inspecting and clipper-confiscating staff at airports, for instance) makes it difficult to believe that present reactive efforts could in anyway resemble viable protection and safety that is so much wanted by the American people.

How did this disconnect between perception and reality develop, and—more importantly—what should be done to correct the public’s misconceptions?

A popular misconception is that U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere have put a significant crimp into the terrorist superstructure. After all, the removal of the Taliban from power and the repeatedly televised sights of mountain-moving Daisy Cutter bombs obliterating underground bunkers went a long way toward convincing the public that the situation was under control and that there must be far fewer terrorists alive to carry out their deadly acts now. This is a flashback reminder of the body counts televised daily in the U.S. during the Vietnam War which when added up showed that the number of Viet Cong killed equaled three times the total population of North Viet Nam. However, the military activities in Afghanistan broadcast over the past year have only temporarily disrupted terrorist organizations; intelligence reports indicate that electronic “chatter” among terrorist networks is increasing again. Terrorist financial activity is viable and terrorists currently operate in 60 countries. No U.S. official source has been able to obtain or verify information on the whereabouts of top al-Qaida leadership. At present some of them are coming out of hiding to wreak more fear, death, and destruction. Recent terrorist activities in Indonesia and the Philippines make a strong case that the American notion of a safer world is an illusion.

In addition, the government has been slow to develop and implement the most important tool in combating terrorism—prevention strategies. Almost all measures taken so far have been reactive rather than proactive. Prevention strategies will take time to implement and include the training of security personnel and the development of programs and systems. However, more than a year has elapsed since 9/11 and this time has been lost for installing prevention approaches, which today are being lauded by terrorism experts as the most important focus for America’s efforts. The DHS is just now coming off the drawing board. This is an opportunity to make prevention the hallmark focus for this new department from its inception. Meanwhile, the country remains as vulnerable as ever. Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of U.S. authorities’ after-the-fact approach to fighting terror is that the perpetrators are smart enough to know that another aircraft hijack-and-suicide scheme won’t work, and so will focus their efforts elsewhere on more vulnerable targets (ports, trucking, subway systems, IT, energy plants) and the use of other weapons: chemical, biological agents, and/or the staggering amount of unaccounted-for radioactive materials that seem to be floating around out there in the world.

The outlook doesn’t have to be as grim as it appears. There are terrorism prevention solutions that can be implemented right away and pay immediate security dividends. For example, there must be an improvement in computer-based systems that combine technology, information, communication, education, and resources management. Currently no system is functioning that connects multiple databases, shares information from multiple government agencies, the states and localities, and operates in real-time. This technology does exist, but the efforts to track it down go wanting. The attitude seems to be, “we need to spend billions more to redevelop it.” The already available horizontal data integration technologies now being called by some, transaction interactions, can already accomplish the desired data sharing and integration in real-time. Why is this existing technology being reinvented? Through implementing such a system, the government could now better monitor border crossings, protect the 361 ports, keep tabs on terror suspects, detect trends and patterns in the information already in databases, and derail terrorist acts before they can happen. This is the essence of prevention. Putting such a complex data integration and sharing system in place seems daunting, but the true barriers are primarily attitudinal and political, rather than technological. If the government commits to sharing and cooperative efforts, it would quickly make a distinct difference in ultimately saving lives.

Interagency communication and cooperation play key roles. As it now stands, bureaucrats guard their “turf” and they no longer know how to share information and work together effectively. The creation of the DHS offers a golden opportunity to set the operating framework toward prevention strategies. This is the make-or-break decisive moment in history that can be used or lost forever. The sooner coordination takes place to instill cooperation and terrorism prevention efforts, the sooner safety can be instituted for the American people.

The resistance to using already developed enhanced technologies continues. Such technologies increase effectiveness when they incorporate information from multiple databases. The existing barriers of “turf” issues, the unwillingness to share, and the lack of cooperation among agencies at all levels (federal, state, regional, and local) are strongly engrained. The saga of the FBI exemplifies these barriers and demonstrates how difficult it is to remove or even modify them.

The notion that the country is better protected against and better able to deal with terrorists attacks now than it was in the wake of 9/11 is far from true. Fourteen plus months and 137.6 billion dollars expended later, America has little to show for its war on terrorism. 2003 can be more of the same with 252.5 billion dollars committed, or it can take a clear and focused approach based on real prevention strategies. Directed by the newly created DHS the misconceptions can be dispelled and any misdirection averted. This opportunity will exist for only a short period of time before the department falls victim to its own destructive bureaucracies.